Abstract: This paper examines the evolution of regional innovation policy in EmiliaRomagna, and Valencia, regions with similar economic features that implemented similar innovation policies in the 1970s and 1980s. We investigate whether their similarities have led to similar targets, policy tools and governance developments. We show that innovation policy in both regions suffered from the effects of privatization, budget constraints and changes to manufacturing during the 1990s and highlight the consequences. Although Emilia-Romagna experienced deeper change to its innovation policy, privatizations and/or the replacement of public funds promoted commercial approaches and induced market failures in both regions. The worst effects of these policies were the implementation of less risky innovation projects, the shift towards extra-regional projects and markets, and the favouring of large firms.
Introduction
This paper examines the evolution of regional innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna, and
Valencia, which have similar economic features and which implemented similar industry policies in the 1970s and 1980s. These policies were related to innovation and linked to the respective territories. The originality and positive consequences of these region's industry policies has attracted research interest focusing especially on the role of the regional agencies ERVET (Emilia-Romagna) and IMPIVA (Valencia) as flagship organizations. In 1982, the 'Emilian model' (Brusco, 1982) , was well known in research on design (Brusco, 1992) and implementation of industry policy aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) (Brusco, 1989; Bellini, Giordani & Pasquini, 1990; Bianchi & Giordani, 1993; Bellini, Mohammad-Saïd &Négrier, 1996; Petrakos, 1996; Cowell, 2010; López-Estornell, Mas-Verdú & Molina-Morales, 2008) , trade union participation in regional economic development (Sleigh, 1993 ) and evolution of the policy model (Cooke, 1996; Bellini & Pasquini 1998; Bianchi, 1998; Amin, 1999; Rinaldi, 2005; Bianchi & Sandrine, 2011) . Several scholars have written about ERVET and other examples of regional development agencies in Italy, for example, Bianchi (1992), Bianchi & Pasquini (1998) , Belussi (1999) , Pietrobelli & Rabelloti (2002 ), Solari (2004 and Maccani & Samoggia (2010) , as well as on real service centres (RSC), for example, Brusco (1992) and Bellini (1996) .
IMPIVA has been investigated by Ors (1994) , Salom-Carrasco (1997) , Ponce (2004) and Muñoz (2009) while its network of Technology Institutes (TI) 2 has attracted the interest of other scholars (Esteve, Martínez-Serrano & Picazo, 2000; Albors-Garrigós, Segarra & Rincó-Díaz , 2010; García-Reche, 2003) . The influence of AIJU, the Valencia's TI related to toy firms is examined in Holmström (2006) , the services provided by INESCOP to the shoe industry is investigated in Tomás, Contreras & Del Saz (2000) , the contribution to environmental services in tile industry by the IT of ceramics (ITC) is explained by García-Reche & Picazo-Tadeo (2007) and the role played in textiles of Emilia-Romagna by CITER, a RSC linked to ERVET, is analysed in Bianchi (1995) , Bianchi & Bellini (1991 , 1995 and Ligabue (1995) , while García-Quevedo & MasVerdú (2008) identify some economic variables that explain the use of the services provided by TI. Some authors study the relationship between use of TI and export activity (Mas-Verdú, Baviera-Puiga & Martínez-Gómez, 2008) , the efficacy of knowledge-intensive services (Martínez-Gómez, Baviera-Puiga & Mas-Verdú, 2010 ) and the effect of the IMPIVA programmes on product quality (Moreno, 1993) .
In addition to work that focuses on either Emilia-Romagna or Valencia, there are some comparative studies. Emilia-Romagna is contrasted with Baden-Württemberg (Heindereich, 1996; Cooke & Morgan, 1994) , and Denmark (Kristensen, 1992) . IMPIVA has been compared with institutions in other regions and countries: see Barge-Gil & Modrego (2007) for a study of TI in several regions of Spain, Holmstrom (1999) for India, Montero (2001) for Brazil, and Samoilovich et al. (2005) This article provides a comparative analysis of one aspect common to these two cases which has not previously been investigated: the evolution over time of their regional innovation policies and whether the regions' socioeconomics similarities have led to similar policy tool and governance trajectories.
We look at the implementation of advanced technological services through the introduction of RSC in Emilia-Romagna and IT in Valencia, and their effect on SME.
We discuss the consequences for policy and firms of the privatizations that occurred in the regions analysed during the 1990s. Comparison of these two cases highlights the conditions needed for persistence (Hughes, 1936) in the institutional arrangements related to new policy, which require adaptation to changing environments and sufficient stability to ensure transformation (Steinberg, 2012) . Comparison of the cases of Valencia and Emilia-Romagna will identify some of the factors related to the dynamic development of innovation service policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research methodology. Section 3 discusses similarities and differences between Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. Section 4 examines innovation policies related to advanced technological services for SME in the two regions. Section 5 summarizes the changes to innovation policy strategies and the effects of the pressures related to the privatization of service provision in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
Research methodology
We chose a qualitative methodology. Information and data were collected using explorative methods. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 individuals who were in positions of responsibility in regional governments and research institutions or were representatives of important firm support organizations (see Annex for list of interviewees). All interviews were conducted by a member of the research team.
Interviewees were sent letters explaining the reasons for the research and topics that would be addressed in the interview. Interviewees were also able to expand on areas of the regional innovation policies.
We also administered a survey, that included questions related to innovation and cluster policy, which was addressed to 40 academics and experts on regional policy and local Secondary information and data were collected during the fieldwork period, from reports, documents, journals and the publications of private and public several institutions related to regional development and innovation policy in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna.
Information was also collected from the publications of relevant support firm organizations in both regions. The region of Emilia Romagna has been studied in detail in the industrial district literature; the Valencian case has received less research attention and, therefore, is described in more detail here.
Emilia-Romagna and Valencia: Main similarities and differences
In the 20th century Emilia-Romagna and Valencia experienced some profound changes, including the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy. In the first phases of the industrialization of these (and many other) regions, handicrafts were important. Both the regions analysed in this paper are specialized in traditional sectors including textiles and clothing, ceramics, furniture, footwear, and food products, although Emilia-Romagna also manufactures a wide array of machinery. In both regions innovation is mainly based on low level presence of in-house R&D and intensive use of embodied technology. 
Some general features of the two regions

Economic and political differences
The major difference between the two regions is that Italy has been a democracy since the end of World War II, but Spain's democratic Constitution did not come to power until 1978. Also, Spain became a member of the European Common Market only in 1986, an important but belated development for Valencia, whose regional economy relies heavily on exporting. Spanish industrialization under Franco's regime was aligned to the establishment and support of large firms to achieve autarchy. National policy involved economic interventionism and trade protectionism both of which were damaging to export-oriented SME.
Both regions have high concentrations of manufacturing SME, but some of their sectoral features differ. Emilia-Romagna has traditional manufacturing sectors, many of which are located along the Via Emilia, and a specialized, diffused machinery sector, which drives innovation in the region. Emilia-Romagna to consolidate international distribution networks and to decentralize some phases of production.
The dominant political party governing Emilia Romagna up to the 1990s was the Italian Communist Party (PCI). 5 It was anti-large firms (Brusco & Pezzini, 1992) , which it saw as a legacy of the fascist oligopolies. It was keen to forge strategic alliances with SME and to consider the big traditional companies as the common enemy. The PCI supported a competitive market as a means to stimulate SME growth and to reduce the market power of the large companies. This resulted in support for an industrial relations 4 Emilia-Romagna also hosts automobile, motorcycle and biomedical firms. 5 Since the early 1990s regional government has been dominated by centre-left coalitions.
framework that favoured SME, and the implementation of policies designed to mitigate the financial and technological advantages of large firms.
In Valencia, political leadership between 1983 and 1995 was with the Socialist Party (PSOE-PSPV), with regional governments predisposed to agreements with unions and employers and generally to creating a climate of collaboration to overcome the difficult economic situation provoked by the oil crisis and political transition.
The powers of the two regional governments are different. The process of regionalization occurred first in Italy, but the level of responsibility and financial resources transferred by the Spanish government to the regions was higher in Spain. Regional public funding combined with EU and national funds enabled the development of strong industrial policy in Valencia. There is another difference that explains why the role of regional government is weaker in Emilia-Romagna, which is the strength of its local and provincial governments compared to those in the region of Valencia, where the regional government has experienced more support. Valencia has a smaller experience of infraregional government intervention in local economic development. Thus, industrial policy in Valencia had fewer reference points pre the process of devolution described in the Spanish Constitution and the Valencia Statute of Autonomy.
By contrast, the lower budget of regional government in Emilia-Romagna stimulated the greater regional coordination of industrial policy with other policies such as formal education and, especially, vocational training. The tradition of the-job-training in firms contributed to this target, although it was also influenced by the need for more skilled workers in the machinery sector and in sectors of the economy that depended on their leadership in quality, design and brand.
Both regions also have different relationships with their respective central governments.
In the case of Valencia, since 1983, it was only in 1995 and the period 2004 to 2011 that the parties in power were different, whereas in the case of Emilia-Romagna, from the introduction of its industrial policy in 1974, the politics of the national and regional governments have rarely coincided.
At the institutional level, the Italian and Spanish employers' associations also show some differences: pluralism and competition in the former case and practical monopoly of representation of employers in the latter. As a result of competition, the degree of association and the force exerted by business associations in providing services to their members are also different and more intense in Emilia-Romagna.
Innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia: implementation in the 1970s and 1980s
Innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia can be described as pioneering in the regional context of the southern European countries (see references Section 1).
Innovation policy started in Emilia-Romagna in the second half of the 1970s and in Valencia in 1983. In the first phase (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) , innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna prioritized SME and the establishment of RSC as government's response to failures to provide specialized and innovative business services (Brusco & Pezzini, 2008) . The measures implemented represented political aims to support the position of the PCI, to develop alternative policies from those promoted by central government, which was controlled by the Christian Democrat Party, and to strengthen the weak regional institutions in a territory governed by powerful local authorities. In Valencia, the regional branch of the Socialist Party (PSPV-PSOE) was in power in 1983 to 1995. Its agenda included encouraging competition among manufacturing SME, which were experiencing productivity problems and high rates of unemployment. Regional policy included diversification of the economy and the maintenance of good relationships with the few big companies located in the region. The policy emphasis was on the so-called real or productive economy as opposed to speculative firms.
Industry policies in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna in the 1970s and 1980s implemented a wide range of tools, although in this paper we focus on a subset related to innovation.
These policies gave support to individual firms outside of traditional industry policy which used to include award of grants, special rates for loans/investments and subsidies to reduce the cost of dismissing workers and focused sectoral policies. Instead, in the regions studied in this paper, the aim was to establish a new economic culture focused on firm innovation.
The Emilia-Romagna government agency, ERVET, 6 was set up in 1974 to manage the ERVET-system, which comprised six sectoral service centres and three horizontal centres. It also promoted or participated in a financial support organization and several local development agencies (see Table 2 ). ERVET had a majority stake in the RSC, which it coordinated and supported financially, with the remaining shares belonging to business associations, municipalities and chambers of commerce.
[ Table 2 about here]
In 1982 the Statute of Autonomy for the Valencian Region was approved. A year later, the first regional elections resulted in a majority for the Socialist Party of Valencia (PSPV-PSOE). The president of the new regional government, in his inaugural address, announced the creation of a regional institute for SME. A team of economists in the research bureau of the Valencia Chamber of Commerce had previously produced several, sectoral focused studies of the Valencian economy (Rico, 1982) . They identified a lack of innovation in the regional industry, lack of technical staff, weakness of the advanced tertiary sector, and territorial concentration of several major low to medium-low technology manufacturing sectors. They identified the Valencian industry as at risk from competition with more technologically advanced firms in developed countries and companies in developing countries that could compete on lower production costs.
The same team conducted analysis of industry policy in other European regions and countries, including Germany, the UK, the Nordic countries, the Basque Country and Italy, to highlight differences with the Valencian context. The situation in Valencia, thus,
was not just a straight copying of the policy in place in Emilia-Romagna as some authors suggest (Cooke, 1996; Holmström, 2006) . Nevertheless, Romano Prodi, a member of The agency, in collaboration with business associations in various sectors, was responsible for 14 TI in the mid-nineties. 7 Most of these were new TI 8 , managed by professionals who were independent of the regional administration. The TI were registered as research and technology associations. This type of cooperation allowed the incorporation of additional companies in the TI and enabled them to have control in their management.
Some of the aims of Valencia TI were similar to the objectives of the Italian RSC: to supply innovative technology services to regional SME to compensate for their scarcity and lack of variety in the region. However, there are also some important differences related mainly to their strategic governance. The first RSC built on a successful training activity, and centres began to be established without any analysis of the specific needs of district firms (Brusco & Pezzini, 1992; . The network of RSC in Emilia Romagna was based on general requirements, which explains the breadth of the services they offered which contrasts starkly to their scarce resources. 9 This implies that theorizing the ERVET model occurred a posteriori rather than being the result of planning, as it might be deduced from the work of some scholars (Bellini, 1990; Bellini, Giordani & Pasquini, 1990; Bianchi & Gualtieri, 1990; Leonardi & Nanetti, 1990; Mazzonis, 1996; Capecchi, 1992; Cooke, 1996; Bellini & Pasquini, 1998) .
10
On the other hand, the IMPIVA network of TI and their services were developed in line with a clear governance strategy and were managed by boards whose membership included firm representatives whose experience was gained through learning by doing.
Operationalization of the IMPIVA network of TI was facilitated by dialogue with firms, 
Changes to innovation policy strategies and differential survival of public provision of innovation services in
Emilia-Romagna and Valencia.
In the 1990s the innovation strategies in both the Spanish and Italian regions changed. In Emilia-Romagna, in the early 1990s and coinciding with the period of political change in regional institutions (1990), ERVET underwent thorough review and assessment of the public support it provided to firms and its supposed unfair competition for private firms belonging to sectors of technological and related services. This review was the result of lobbying by the employer's associations attached to large firms (Rinaldi, 2005; Mazzonis, 1996) , but also served the interests of other business associations. It was hoped that reducing ERVET's influence would increase the spread of a 'free market' and allow new services to be offered by associations of employers. This lobbying effort coincided with regional budget constraints and had consequences for some nodes in the RSC network, which either disappeared or was forced to accept the reduced public financial support.11
The reorientation of RSC was a result also of the large number of centres that had been established and their original rather ambitious goals, which were out of kilter with the available resources (see Table 2 ). Among the 11 IMPIVA TI for which data are available, in the 1990s, the number of employed staff was 420 researchers, engineers and support staff (Ors, 1994) This profound change calls into question the robustness attributed to Emilian institutional model (Cooke & Morgan, 1998) .
The reform of ERVET passed by government in 1993 led to a reduction in its responsibilities and resources. The RSC made efforts to adapt to the new framework and new competition rules and offer its services to medium-sized and large regional companies and to firms located in other Italian regions. However, some of the provisions of the new regional law were not fulfilled, such as the functions attributed to ERVET for the creation of scientific and technological nodes, technology transfer and economic 11 Note that Brusco (1993) suggests that government intervention was limited to about 5 years and proposed the introduction of user fees to contribute to the self-financing of the RSC. There were also other reasons for the crisis in ERVET related to changes in the regional economy that occurred in the 1980s and the emergence of new business hierarchies that replaced the traditional SME in relation to their size and marketing and management skills (Bellini & Pasquini 1998). profiting from research, functions that were assumed by ASTER (Agency for Technological Development of Emilia-Romagna), which had been created in 1985 and initially was part of ERVET. In 2003 there was a second reform that resulted in ERVET becoming a regional development agency responsible for (among other tasks) providing technical assistance to the region's infrastructure and attracting foreign investment, promoting cooperation with developing countries and developing collaborative activities with other European regions.
In the early 1990s, Valencia suffered a major economic crisis. The victory of the conservative (Popular) party in the 1995 regional elections threatened the prevailing policy. Since the implementation in 1983 of the new innovation policy, the top regional representatives of the main Spanish employers' association were opposed to IMPIVA, considering it interventionist, elitist and not focused on the problems being experienced by firms.12 They advocated for a more traditional industry policy incorporating grants, subsidies and low borrowing rates to encourage business investment, and other initiatives not linked to a specific innovation strategy. It could be argued that employers were trying to maintain a monopoly on the relationships between government and firms, which they saw as being threatened by firms having ties to regional government through TI.
However, the TI were intended to be governed by ad-hoc associations of firms interested in new services to facilitate innovation activities, and IMPIVA funded part of the investment needed for these activities through a combined bottom-up/ top-down/ process.
The model of governance in 1995 supported a wide ranging relationship between firms'
12 Some initial opponents subsequently admitted to misunderstanding the rationale for this regional government policy: the terms technological innovation, product differentiation, design, trademark, quality and internationalization were 'too' new for many firms.
sectoral associations and the TI. Some of these associations were able to buffer the activities of the conservative government and the higher representatives of the employers' association. It became clear that the network of TI would survive only with the support of the regional agency, otherwise it would sink because the employers' sectoral associations were not sufficiently strong to sustain it. As result, the new regional government decided to reduce only partially economic support to the TI but making future funding uncertain and promoting self-financing.
The bottom-up approach of the IMPIVA network of TI, which was a conscious strategy, enabled the network to resist some of the pressure to abandon the former innovation policy, resulting in a decoupling of industry policy from an ideological position that was likely to damage cooperation among IMPIVA, firms and the TI. This explains the lower levels of privatization and self-financing in Valencia than in Emilia-Romagna. On the other hand, Emilia-Romagna developed a strong mechanical sector that requires high levels of technological expertise, which has encouraged the development of advanced services in private firms while the technology requirement for Valencia's manufacturing sectors and specialization of advanced services, like those intensive in knowledge, is much lower, supporting continuity of the TI.
Finally, we discuss the consequences of policy changes in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia and the effects of a shift towards more self-financing of the RSC and TI after the crisis in the mid-1990s. First, both organizations began to force closer relationships with large companies. This was not a retrograde step because it can lead to the acquisition of new expertise; however, it is counterproductive if it increases the likelihood of smaller firms being excluded due to the higher transaction costs involved in providing innovative and non-standardized services. Second, the TI service centres began to focus on low risk projects, a strategy that had three major consequences. First, an emphasis on projects funded by European programmes, which were low risk, provided the possibility of more certain finance in the long term, and opportunities for international relationships and contacts with new sources of knowledge. Second, it became more difficult to develop collaborative regional projects involving several centres, which required long term commitment or investment in new infrastructure, because of the higher risks and higher implementation and transaction costs. Third, the scarce provision of new, specialised and risky new services because, also according to the new criterion, they have not demand enough to justify their implementation, confronted with well-known and standardized services, more efficient from this point of view (Bellini 2002) .
In IMPIVA's case, there was a loss of 'freshness' in the relationships among network nodes. Even moderation of regional-government positions after an initial hostile reception, did not prevent some loss of IMPIVA's leadership. An indirect example is the creation by the TI of a lobby to defend their positions before IMPIVA and Spanish public administration.
Conclusions
The paper contrasted innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. Both regions have several similar economic and demographic features, including their industrialization processes, high proportion of SME, specialization in traditional manufacturing, concentration of firms in industrial districts and export activity.
They both introduced innovative policy tools targeting SME, such as RSC (EmiliaRomagna) and TI (Valencia) in an attempt to overcome the barriers to providing advanced technological services to these firms. However, implementation and policy development followed different paths and were of different intensity due to the differences between the institutional and governance models of these regions and resulting greater strength of Valencia's policy.
In the 1990s, both regional governments revised their policies with the aim of reducing the public interventionism. The result was higher levels of privatization and selffinancing in Emilia-Romagna than in Valencia. In the Italian region, the absence of an initial and persistent strategy, the presence of different employers' associations with their own networks of firm services, the development of a private sector for advanced services, regional budget constraints, the small size of most RSC and the political changes since 1989 exerted strong pressure against regional policy. The result was an abrupt switch towards privatization of the services previously offered by ERVET and deep transformation of this agency.
In Valencia, the conscious choice of bottom-up governance supported a closer relationship between IMPIVA and firms' sectoral associations and innovative SME, which favoured the survival of the TI even in the difficult economic and political conditions of mid 1990s. Also, features of IMPIVA's original policies had an impact, for example, the holistic conception of its programmes, which allowed for synergies between TI and companies, and territorial decentralization of its innovation policies. There were also factors such as appropriate budget, small development of private firms in the field of knowledge services and the scale economies achieved by TI. All this aspects contributed to strengthening policy which helped SME and created a new and positive image of regional industry. However, the reduction in public funding had some negative consequences for the SME in both regions by encouraging lower risk service provision, priority being given to large companies' needs, and extra-regional projects designed to ensure continuity of the TI and RSC.
An industry innovation policy for SME, that is strong enough to survive the turmoil of political and economic changes needs an appropriate level of public governance that is not overly bureaucratic and is oriented to cognitive and territorial proximity to the policy recipients. This does not imply inertia or suggest that there is no need for evaluations and modifications to policy. Current problems are different from those in the 1980s and 1990s and policy must be adapted to reflect the new challenges. At the same time, policy takes time to achieve its objectives (Steinberg, 2012) . We believe this comparative study of the Emilia-Romagna and Valencian cases provides some interesting lessons for scholars and policy makers keen to understand and achieve this subtle equilibrium between institutional continuity and adaptation to change. 
